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I. Introduction 
Medicare was established in 1965 to provide health insurance 
to all Americans aged sixty-five or older, regardless of income or 
medical history.1 At that time, roughly half of all American seniors 
lacked health insurance, largely a function of the high cost of 
ensuring the elderly.2 Today, Medicare provides health insurance 
to virtually all seniors, and in total serves over fifty five million 
Americans.3 Medicare provides a full spectrum of medical services 
to forty six million seniors as well as specialized coverage for nine 
million Americans of all ages with permanent disabilities.4  
Medicare has grown considerably since its inception and as 
more services were added over time.5 Part A and Part B, referred 
to as “Original Medicare,” comprised hospital and medical 
insurance.6 Later, in 1972, more people became eligible for 
Medicare, including many Americans with disabilities.7 The 
biggest change to Medicare came in 2003, with the addition of 
Medicare Part C, Medicare Advantage Plans, and Part D, 
                                                                                                     
 1. Juliette Cubanski et al., Primer on Medicare: Key Facts About the 
Medicare Program and the People It Covers, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 
20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/medicare/report/a-primer-on-medicare-how-does-
medicare-pay-providers-in-traditional-medicare/ (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 2. See id. (“Prior to 1965, roughly half of all seniors lacked medical 
insurance; today virtually all seniors have health insurance under Medicare.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See CMS’ Program History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/about-cms/agency-information/history/index.html (last 
updated Sept. 14, 2017) (describing each additional layer of expansion to the 
Medicare program since its inception in 1965) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
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prescription drug benefits.8 In 2010, the Affordable Care Act 
brought more changes to Medicare.9  
These expansions have made today’s Medicare an enormous 
federal program, accounting for fifteen percent of total federal 
spending in 2015, a total of $633 billion dollars.10 The sheer 
amount is staggering, and it comes as little surprise that the 
federal government is the country’s single largest purchaser of 
prescription drugs.11 Medicare’s status as the country’s largest 
healthcare provider and customer of drugs have made Medicare 
payments a critical source of revenue for hospitals across the 
country.12  
Rural hospitals rely heavily on Medicare payments to provide 
much needed services in their communities.13 Take, for example, 
some of the plaintiff hospitals in the cases that are the subject of 
this note. Mountain Head, Arkansas’ Baxter Regional Medical 
Center derives sixty-five percent of its gross revenue from 
Medicare.14 Its co-plaintiffs derived forty-seven and fifty-five 
percent of their total revenue from Medicare.15 These hospitals are 
                                                                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. (describing the changes the Affordable Care Act made to Medicare 
and Medicaid). 
 10. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET & ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2016 TO 
2026, Table F-5 (2016). 
 11. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURES 2016 HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Stat 
istics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpe 
ndData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (noting that “the federal government 
accounted for the largest share of health care spending”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 12. See Cubanski et al., supra note 1 (“Out of $597 billion in total benefit 
spending in 2014, Medicare paid $376 billion (63%) for benefits delivered by 
health care providers in traditional Medicare.”). 
 13. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FACTSHEET 1 (2017) https://www.aha.org/system 
/files/2018-02/2017-01-rural-fs_0.pdf (noting that “[r]ural hospitals’ patient mix 
also makes them more reliant on public programs and, thus, particularly 
vulnerable to Medicare and Medicaid payment cuts”) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 14. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(“Baxter Regional Medical Center, a 268-bed regional hospital in Arkansas that 
derives 65% of its gross revenue from Medicare.”). 
 15. See id. (“Covenant Health . . . derives 55% of its gross revenue from 
Medicare [and] . . . Rutland Regional Medical Center . . . derives 47% of its 
revenues from Medicare.”). 
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highly vulnerable to any disruption in being paid for rendering 
Medicare services.16 
In recent years, many of these payments have been delayed 
indefinitely due to an enormous backlog of claims at the 
Department of Health and Human Services.17 Ostensibly, 
hospitals are paid for rendering services to Medicare patients by 
submitting claims to government contractors.18 If those claims are 
denied, they enter a complex claim and appeal process that is 
intended to be resolved within one year.19 A massive influx of 
claims made this process completely break down, creating a 
backlog of over 800,000 cases nationwide that the Department 
simply could not handle.20 Statutory deadlines for processing 
claims became ignored and hospitals were not being paid.21 In fact, 
many claims failed to resolve for up to a decade.22 The Department 
simply lacked the resources necessary to handle the claims, and 
Congress failed to provide them.23 
This Note will examine the extensive litigation and ongoing 
controversy arising from this backlog of Medicare claims. The 
central issue in these cases was whether the courts have the 
authority to order the Department to resolve the backlog. Under 
the status quo, the department routinely violates statutory 
deadlines, as claims that should have been solved within ninety 
days were not decided for years at a time.24 However, as will be 
discussed below, the department could not resolve the backlog 
                                                                                                     
 16. See id. (discussing the dependence of plaintiffs’ hospitals on Medicare). 
 17. See id. (noting the backlog of claims at the Department of Health and 
Human Services). 
 18. See id. at 186 (explaining that hospitals get paid for rendering services 
to Medicare patients by submitting claims to government contractors). 
 19. See id. at 187–90 (describing the Medicare appeals process). 
 20. See id. at 187 (“OMHA still has the capacity to process only 72,000 
appeals per year, a far cry from . . . the over 800,000 appeals that composed its 
backlog in 2014.”). 
 21. See id. at 188–89 (indicating that hospitals were not being paid because 
of large delays in the appeals process). 
 22. See id. at 187 (“[S]ome already-filed claims could take a decade or more 
to resolve.”). 
 23. See id. at 187–88 (discussing Congress’ failure to give appropriate 
resources to the Department of Health and Human Services). 
 24. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., infra note 33, at 2 (describing how 
much time an ALJ has to issue a ruling). 
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without violating other congressional mandates. This situation has 
significant implications for the separation of powers: to fashion an 
effective remedy, the courts had to decide whether to dictate the 
affairs of an executive agency or refuse to enforce congressional 
mandates.25 Neither made for a desirable outcome. 
Part II will provide a more detailed description of how the 
Medicare payment system works and then explain how the backlog 
developed. Part III will discuss why this issue has proven so 
difficult to solve. Parts IV through VI will examine the procedural 
history of this issue, which includes multiple appeals and remands, 
as well a considerable split between the Fourth and D.C. Circuits.26 
Part VII will compare the approaches of the two circuits and argue 
that both circuits should have placed far greater impetus on 
Congress to address this issue. Each court here concluded that the 
Department was put in a bind and could not address the situation 
without additional resources.27 Despite this, Congress has taken 
no remedial action and it has been nearly four years since this 
litigation began.28 Without needed assistance, the courts have been 
unable to resolve this crisis and no end appears in sight. 
II. Medicare’s Administrative Appeals System and the 
“Incontrovertibly Grotesque” Backlog29 
This section will outline how the appeals system works, 
reasons for the formation of the backlog, and the scale of the 
problem. Section A will first provide a detailed overview of the 
administrative appeals process, laying out the various stages a 
                                                                                                     
 25. See id. at 189 (“The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked 
only in extraordinary circumstances.”). 
 26. Compare Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (ruling that mandamus jurisdiction was not warranted to address the 
Medicare backlog), with Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (ruling that mandamus jurisdiction was warranted to address the Medicare 
backlog). 
 27. See, e.g., See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 187–88 (concluding that the 
Department cannot address the backlog without more resources). 
 28. See id. (stating that Congress has not acted to fix the lack of resources). 
 29. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 50 (describing the 
administrative process and appeals backlog for Medicare reimbursement as 
“incontrovertibly grotesque”). 
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claim goes through before a healthcare provider receives payment. 
Section B will discuss the backlog itself, demonstrating how much 
of a problem it has become, and how unequipped the Department 
is to address it. Section C will discuss the RAC program, a 
component of the Affordable Care Act that is seen as the primary 
driver of the backlog. Finally, Section D will look at attempts to fix 
the backlog, and why those attempts have failed.  
A. Detailed Overview of the Medicare Administrative 
Appeals Process 
The administrative appeals system at issue is a five-step 
process.30 First, after a hospital or other health care provider 
performs Medicare eligible services, they submit a claim to a 
Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC).31 A MAC is a private 
health care insurer that has been awarded a geographic 
jurisdiction to process certain Medicare claims.32 MACs process an 
estimated 1.2 billion fee-for-service clams for more than 33.9 
million beneficiaries every year.33 MACs are multi-state, regional 
contractors, which serve as the primary contact between Medicare 
and healthcare providers.34 The MAC decides whether or not to pay 
the healthcare provider’s claim.35 
If the claim is denied, the Medicare Act provides a four-level 
administrative appeals process followed by judicial review.36 The 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185 (“If a claim is denied, the Medicare 
Act provides a four-level administrative appeal process, followed by judicial 
review.”). 
 31. See id. (explaining the first step of the Medicare appeals process). 
 32. What is a MAC, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-Administrative-
Contractors/What-is-a-MAC.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 33. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE APPEALS 
PROCESS 1 (2017) http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/omha/files/medicare-
appeals-backlog.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 34. What is a MAC, supra note 32. 
 35. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (“The MAC decides 
whether to pay or deny the claim.”). 
 36. See id. (“If a claim is denied, the Medicare Act provides a four-level 
administrative appeal process, followed by judicial review.”). 
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first step is an appeal to the MAC for “redetermination.”37 At this 
level, the appellants have 120 days from the initial claim denial to 
file a request for redetermination.38 There is no amount-
in-controversy requirement.39 The MAC is to complete a 
redetermination within sixty days after the MAC receives the 
appeal.40 
The second level of appeal is “Reconsideration” by a Qualified 
Independent Contractor (QIC).41 Parties dissatisfied with the 
MAC’s decision have 180 days from the day they receive the 
redetermination decision to file a request for reconsideration.42 
There is no amount-in-controversy requirement.43 QICs utilize “a 
comprehensive data system . . . give weight to carrier and fiscal 
intermediary local coverage determinations, and conduct a panel 
review of all medical necessity denials.”44 The Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) awards contracts to and oversees the 
decisions made by MACs and QICs.45 
The third level, and most important for the purposes of this 
note, is de novo review by an administrative law judge (ALJ), 
which includes a hearing.46 This level is overseen by the Office of 
Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA).47 A party has sixty days 
                                                                                                     
 37. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 1 (describing the 
first step in the Medicare appeals process). 
 38. See id. (stating the timeframe for first step Medicare appeals). 
 39. See id. (explaining how there is no amount in controversy requirement). 
 40. See id. (discussing how long a MAC has to issue a decision). 
 41. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the second step in the Medicare appeals 
process). 
 42. See id. at 1 (stating the timeframe for second step Medicare appeals). 
 43. See id. (explaining how there is no amount in controversy requirement). 
 44. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Qualified Independent 
Contractors (QIC) Fact Sheet 1 (2007) [hereinafter Qualified Independent 
Contractors (QIC) Fact Sheet], https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/ 
Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNEdWebGuide/Downloads/QIC_Fact_ 
Sheet.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 45. See What is a MAC, supra note 32 (“CMS procures all MAC contracts 
according to the Federal Acquisition Program.”); see also Qualified Independent 
Contractors (QIC) Fact Sheet, supra note 44 (noting that CMS awarded QIC 
contracts to eight contractors to provide reconsiderations). 
 46. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(detailing the third level of Medicaid appeals). 
 47. See id. (indicating who oversees third level Medicare appeals). 
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after receiving the QIC decision to file a request for a hearing with 
an ALJ at OMHA.48 There is a $150 amount in controversy 
requirement.49 Critically, the ALJ is required to “conduct a hearing 
and render a decision within ninty days beginning on the date the 
request for hearing is filed.”50 The ALJ stage is crucial for hospitals 
because the ALJ hearings are conducted de novo, whereas the 
higher stages of review use a deferential standard.51 ALJ hearings 
are the only opportunity for the healthcare provider to present 
evidence to rebut the Department’s factual record.52 The huge 
volume of appeals has rendered OMHA unable to render decisions 
within ninety days, resulting in a case backlog that has reached 
over 800,000 cases.53 The D.C. Circuit noted that, at the time of its 
ruling, it may take as long as a decade to sort through the entire 
backlog.54 In fact, the situation became so dire that OMHA 
suspended assigning appeals to ALJ dockets.55 
If the ALJ does not render a decision within the statutory 
timeframe, the appellant may request a review by the Medicare 
Appeals Council at the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB).56 
This is the fourth and final level of appeal before judicial review in 
a district court.57 Parties may appeal an ALJ ruling within sixty 
                                                                                                     
 48. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 2 (explaining the 
timeframe for third level Medicare appeals). 
 49. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185 (stating that there is a $150 amount 
in controversy requirement for third level Medicare appeals). 
 50. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 2 (describing how 
much time an ALJ has to issue a ruling). 
 51. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–89 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(noting that at the DAB stage, a hearing is conducted only if an “extraordinary 
question” is presented). 
 52. See id. at 188 (noting that delays at the ALJ stage are particularly 
difficult for hospitals, because the Department recoups funds before reaching the 
ALJ hearing). 
 53. See id. at 187 (“[I]n December 2013, OMHA’s Chief ALJ sent a 
memorandum informing various hospitals that OMHA had temporarily 
suspended assigning appeals to ALJ dockets, that the suspension would last ‘at 
least 24 months,’ and that the agency ‘expect[ed] post-assignment hearing wait 
times [would] continue to exceed 6 months.’”). 
 54. See id. (“These figures suggest that at current rates, some already filed 
claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”). 
 55. Id.  
 56. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 2. 
 57. Id.  
BATTLE OF THE BACKLOG 653 
days from receiving the decision.58 Parties may also file a request 
to “escalate” the appeal from the ALJ level if the ALJ has not 
rendered a decision within ninety days.59 This process of 
“escalation” essentially skips the ALJ hearing and proceeds to the 
DAB board.60 The Council must render a decision within ninety 
days of receiving the appeal.61 If the ninety day deadline is not met, 
the appellant may request that the appeal be “escalated” to district 
court.62 Similar to the ALJ stage of the process, an overwhelming 
number of appeals has left the DAB unable to comply with the 
ninety day framework.63 
B. The Backlog 
If all of these time periods are met, appeals work through the 
administrative process within about a year.64 For context, more 
than 1.2 billion Medicare fee-for-service claims were processed in 
fiscal year 2015.65 Ten percent of these claims, or 123 million, were 
denied.66 Of these, 3.7 million or three percent of all denied 
Medicare claims were appealed.67 From fiscal year (FY) 2010 to FY 
2015, OMHA received a 442 percent increase in its annual number 
of appeals.68 Despite the flood of claims, funding for the 
Department during this period remained largely stagnant, leaving 
it completely unable to adjudicate the claims in compliance with 
the statutory framework.69 By the end of FY 2015, 884,017 appeals 
                                                                                                     
 58. Id. 
 59. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(outlining the escalation process providers must use to advance appeals to the 
next stage including “the DAB stage if the ALJ fails to act within the required 
ninety days”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 3. 
 64. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186 (explaining the timeline of the 
appeals process). 
 65. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 3. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. (“However, while the volume of appeals has increased 
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were pending before OMHA.70 The Department estimated that 
given its current resources and without any additional appeals, it 
would take eight years for OMHA to process its backlog.71 
OMHA, and more broadly the Department, can only process 
roughly 75,000 appeals per year.72 As a result, OMHA suspended 
assigning appeals to ALJ dockets and noted that the suspension 
would last “at least 24 months.”73 By statute, appeals at this stage 
are supposed to be heard by an ALJ within ninety days of OMHA 
receiving the matter.74 Notwithstanding, “as of February 2015, the 
decisions ALJ’s were releasing had been pending for an average of 
572 days” and “some already-filed claims could take a decade or 
more to resolve.”75  
C. Causes of the Backlog, the RAC Program 
The D.C. Circuit found that the main driver of the backlog has 
been the implementation of the Medicare Recovery Audit 
Program.76 The Recovery Audit program was implemented in 2010 
as part of the Affordable Care Act, with the responsibility of 
“identifying underpayments and overpayments and recouping 
overpayments.”77 The program had an expansive mandate as 
Congress specified it must have “nationwide coverage.”78 The 
recovery audit contractors (RAC’s), are paid on a contingent basis 
                                                                                                     
dramatically, funding has remained comparatively stagnant.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 6 (noting annual adjudication capacity of 65,000 in FY 2012, 
72,000 in FY 2014, and 87,000 in 2016). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2014) (“[A]n administrative law judge 
shall conduct and conclude a hearing . . . and render a decision on such hearing” 
within ninety days.”). 
 75. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 76. See id. at 186–87 (summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s finding that the 
administrative appeals process functioned within the statutory time frames until 
2010 when the Department Secretary fully implemented the Medicare Recovery 
Audit Program which included the RAC appeals program). 
 77. Id. at 186 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(h)(1)(2016)). 
 78. See id. (“Congress also specified certain other features of the program, 
such as that it must have ‘[n]ationwide coverage,’ . . . it left the Secretary broad 
discretion to determine many other program details.”). 
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for collecting overpayments.79 The RAC program has been quite 
successful, recovering $2.3 billion and $3.65 billion in 
overpayments in FY 2012 and FY 2013, respectively.80 
The RAC program has also created an enormous problem. 
RAC decisions are appealable through the same administrative 
process outlined above.81 The result was an enormous increase in 
appeals before the Office of Medicare Administration.82 In FY 
2011, before the RAC program was fully implemented, the total 
number of administrative appeals was a manageable 59,600, well 
within the Department’s capacity.83 By FY 2013, the total number 
of backlogged cases grew to more than 384,000.84 When the case 
got to the D.C. Circuit, the backlog reached over 800,000.85 Simply 
put, the RAC program has recovered billions of dollars in waste, 
fraud and abuse, but, it has also created a backlog of appeals “that 
makes compliance with the statutory time frames impossible.”86 
The RAC program’s role in driving the backlog is clear, as 
forty-six percent of the appeals before OMHA originated from the 
RAC program.87 While there are some other contributors, the RAC 
program is seen as the primary culprit.88 
                                                                                                     
 79. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186. 
 80. Id. at 187. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (“Thus, the number of appeals filed ballooned from 59,600 in fiscal 
year 2011 to more than 384,000 in fiscal year 2013.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(explaining that the plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary 
to act within the statutory time frames for the RAC program). 
 87. See id. at 187 (“[B]ecause RAC denials are appealable through the same 
administrative process as initial denials, the RAC program has contributed to a 
drastic increase in the number of administrative appeals.”). 
 88. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 33 (listing one of “four 
primary drivers” of the backlog as the “National implementation of the Medicare 
fee-for-service Recovery Audit Program (RAP)”). 
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D. Attempts to Fix the Backlog 
DHHS has taken steps to alleviate the backlog, some of which 
have been marginally effective.89 For example, OMHA has doubled 
the number of cases the average ALJ resolves each year.90 It also 
secured funding for seven additional ALJ’s in FY 2014, a ten 
percent increase in staff.91 More recently the Department has 
created a new position, attorney adjudicator, authorized to issue a 
decision in any case that does not require a hearing.92 However, 
attorney adjudicators have not done much to resolve the backlog. 
The backlog consists of claims that are awaiting a hearing by an 
ALJ, so attorney adjudicators cannot address them.93 The 
Department also created its “Low Volume Appeals Initiative” 
whereby service providers with smaller numbers of claims could 
settle them in bulk for a specified amount.94  
The Department’s successes have been limited considering 
that OMHA can only resolve about 70,000 appeals per year.95 This 
is completely inadequate in the face of 400,000 appeals in FY 2013 
and over 800,000 appeals in FY 2014.96 The root cause of the issue 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 187 (“The Secretary has worked to 
address the backlog and corresponding delays.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Christopher Cheney, Medicare Claims-Appeal Backlog: New Rules 
Push Faster Processing, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (June 30, 2017), http:// www. 
healthleadersmedia.com/finance/medicare-claims-appeal-backlog-new-rules-
push-faster-processing (“Attorney adjudicators are a new position at the ALJ level 
created this year to help clear the appeal backlog.”) (on file with Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 93. See id. (specifying that attorney adjudicators may not preside over claims 
which require a hearing).  
 94. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Low Volume Appeals 
Initiative (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-
systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealth 
accountshistorical.html (describing program that allows service providers with 
500 or fewer pending appeals to apply for bulk settlement for 62% of the amount 
in controversy) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 95. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(“OMHA still has the capacity to process only about 72,000 appeals per year, a far 
cry from the almost 400,000 appeals it received in fiscal year 2013, or from the 
over 800,000 appeals that composed its backlog in July 2014.”). 
 96. Id.  
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is a dramatically increased workload with stagnant funding for the 
Department.97 The D.C. Circuit noted that it believes many of 
these appeals will not be heard by an ALJ for at least a decade.98 
OMHA recognized its position, and in a December 2013 
memorandum, informed various hospitals that it would 
temporarily suspend assigning appeals to ALJ dockets for at least 
twenty-four months.99 
Congress has considered a bill to increase funding for OMHA, 
as well as to reform the overall process.100 The Senate Finance 
Committee has held hearings on the issue, and its chairman, Orrin 
Hatch, noted that the Department cannot effectively address its 
backlog without Congressional action.101 A bill known as the 
AFIRM Act would provide $125 million in additional annual 
funding to OMHA, as well as to other reforms.102 The D.C. Circuit 
noted that “the bill remains only a bill” and at the time of this 
writing the bill has not proceeded out of committee.103 
Compounding the sheer size of the backlog is the success rate 
of these appeals.104 The American Hospital Association performed 
                                                                                                     
 97. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 33, at 3 (“[W]hile the 
volume of appeals has increased dramatically, funding has remained 
comparatively stagnant.”). 
 98. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 187 (“These figures suggest that at 
current rates, some already-filed claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. (“Congress is fully aware of both the backlog and its connection to 
the RAC program.”). 
 101. See Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., Opening Statement at 
Finance Hearing on Medicare Audit and Appeals (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www. 
finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-at-finance-hearing-on-
medicare-audit-and-appeals (“The Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals has 
also taken steps to address its backlog, but there is only so much the agency can 
do with their current authorities and staffing.”) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 102. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(showing how the increase in funding combined with other reforms to the appeal 
process can address the backlog issue). 
 103. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. CV14-851, 2016 WL 5106997, at 
*230 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2016) (“No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the 
Secretary offers no evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that the bill 
has support in the House of Representatives, or that the President would sign 
it.”).  
 104. See Am. Hosp. Assoc., 812 F.3d at 188 (“If the vast majority of these 
delayed appeals were ultimately denied, they might amount to little more than 
an unfortunate nuisance. The record suggests, however, that many have merit.”). 
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a survey of hospitals, finding that fifty-two percent of RAC denials 
were appealed, and sixty-six percent of those appeals were 
successful.105 DHHS admitted that at least as many as forty-three 
percent of all appeals, both RAC and non-RAC denials, are 
successful.106 The success rate of these appeals, and the plaintiff 
hospitals’ reliance on revenue from Medicare, underscored the 
necessity of resolving the backlog.  
The backlog’s concentration at the ALJ stage of the appeals 
process is highly significant. HHS recoups funds after the QIC 
stage, the stage which immediate precedes ALJ review.107 The 
plaintiff hospitals derive most their revenue from treating 
Medicare patients, therefore “they are often deprived of access to 
significant funds to which they are entitled.”108 This, coupled with 
hospitals’ high success rate at the ALJ level, imposes a heavy toll 
upon hospitals.109 The ALJ review is also important for evidentiary 
reasons. An ALJ hearing provides for de novo review, while the 
“escalate[d]” review uses a more deferential standard.110 
III. The Issue Before the Courts 
The issue in these cases considered whether a court has the 
power to compel the Department to resolve the backlog.111 On the 
surface, this case seemed straightforward, as the statutory 
deadlines are quite clear. For the Department to grant the relief 
requested, it would have been necessary to scrap or severely curtail 
the RAC program.112 If the court gave such an order, it would 
                                                                                                     
 105. See id. (citing a survey conducted in 2014 by one of the plaintiffs in this 
case that hospitals responded to). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(2)(A) (2016). 
 108. See id. (describing how these hospitals have been forced to cut back 
services to Medicare patients, as the hospitals are wary of performing certain 
services because they are not sure when or if they will be paid). 
 109. See id. (noting that the plaintiff hospitals derived roughly forty-seven to 
sixty-five percent of their gross revenue from Medicare). 
 110. Id. at 185–86. 
 111. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45–46 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(“Plaintiffs brought this suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
for an order compelling her to process their administrative appeals in accordance 
with statutory timelines.”). 
 112. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–87 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
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create a separation of powers issue.113 In most circumstances, a 
court has no right to order the affairs of an executive agency.114 To 
provide relief, the court would have had to make determinations of 
how to allocate the department’s resources, and dictate to the 
Secretary how much can be spent on the RAC program, backlog 
alleviation, or other priorities.115 This potential “intrusion” on the 
inner workings of an agency presented a serious risk of improper 
infringement of executive branch autonomy.116 
The courts faced a separation of powers issue regarding 
Congress as well, as they would be deciding which of two statutes 
should be enforced and which should be ignored.117 Congress 
authorized both the framework and statutory deadlines for 
Medicare claims and appeals and the creation of the RAC 
program.118 Any significant curtailment of the RAC program would 
frustrate Congress’ intent in creating it, and as noted above, the 
RAC program has been remarkably successful in its mission of 
recovering misspent funds.119 But enforcing the RAC program 
would force the agency to violate statutory deadlines. In sum, the 
courts ultimately were going to disrupt the will of Congress 
whether or not they chose to grant the plaintiff relief.120 If the 
courts dismissed the case, the statutory framework for these 
                                                                                                     
(showing how this case is about an agency caught between two congressionally 
assigned tasks). 
 113. See id. (describing that absent further congressional action the Secretary 
would have to drastically curtail the RAC program to comply with such an order, 
and that the political branches are endeavoring to address the issue).  
 114. See id. (explaining how ordering the affairs of an executive agency would 
probably require the agency to make major changes to its operations, which could 
limit the scope of a statutorily mandated program). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. (highlighting other issues with the Congress ordering the affairs 
of an executive agency). 
 118. See id. (showing how Congress is caught in the middle because it gave 
the court power to enforce the framework and deadlines for Medicare claims, but 
also authorized the creation of the program itself). 
 119. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 56 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(explaining how RACs were introduced as a check on improper payments, and 
have been successful in their role, recouping $2.3 billion in 2012). 
 120. See id. at 45 (stating how no matter which way the courts held in the 
case, the intentions of Congress would be disrupted). 
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appeals would continue to be blatantly violated.121 At the same 
time, if they granted relief, they would be displacing the will of 
Congress and intruding into the policy decisions of an executive 
agency.122  
The courts that considered this issue were understandably 
confounded.123 Ultimately, the crisis is not the fault of the courts 
or even of the Department.124 The driver of this crisis is 
Congressional inaction, specifically, failure to provide necessary 
appropriations for additional Administrative Law Judges for the 
Department.  
IV. American Hospital Association v. Burwell I 
This section will discuss the first round of opinions in the 
American Hospital saga. Part A will discuss the D.C. District’s 
opinion on first impression. Here, the court ruled for the 
Department, holding that the relief sought would have intruded 
impermissibly into the affairs of an executive agency. Part B will 
detail the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that overruled the district court. 
In that opinion, the court held that the District Court indeed had 
jurisdiction and could provide relief to the hospitals if the political 
branches continued to fail to act.  
A. Original Action in the D.C. District Court: The Court Refused 
to Grant Mandamus Jurisdiction or Relief. 
On first impression, the D.C. District Court ruled for the 
Department, dismissing the case due to the thorny jurisdictional 
                                                                                                     
 121. See id. (highlighting that Congress could violate the appeals process if it 
dismissed the case). 
 122. See id. (showing that if relief is granted, the will of Congress will be 
ignored). 
 123. Compare Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 50 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (holding that mandamus jurisdiction was not warranted to address the 
backlog), with Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(holding that mandamus jurisdiction was warranted). 
 124. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188–89 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(explaining how the District Court hoped the Secretary and Congress would work 
together to solve how OMHA could receive more resources). 
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environment.125 The Plaintiff Hospitals had sought a writ of 
mandamus that would force the Secretary to adjudicate their 
pending administrative appeals in a timely fashion.126 The Court 
noted the size and scale of the backlog and that it “sympathizes 
with the Plaintiffs’ plight” but found that the Department’s delay 
“while far from ideal, is not so egregious as to warrant 
intervention.”127 
The district court’s inquiry was focused largely on the 
“extraordinary” nature of the mandamus remedy.128 “Mandamus is 
‘drastic,’ ‘it is available only in extraordinary situations,’ and ‘it is 
hardly every granted.”129 To be entitled to mandamus relief, 
Plaintiffs must show that (1) they have a clear and indisputable 
right to relief, (2) that the agency has a clear duty to act, and 
(3) that there is no other adequate remedy available to them.130 
Further, the party seeking mandamus carries the burden of 
showing that its right to issuance of the writ is clear and 
indisputable.131 Beyond these necessary requirements, “even if the 
plaintiff overcomes all these hurdles, whether mandamus relief 
should issue is discretionary.”132  
Mandamus involves both a jurisdictional and a merits inquiry 
that is said to “merge.”133 This is because a court’s jurisdiction to 
compel a government official or agency to act is limited to specific 
circumstances in which a “clear and compelling duty is owed to the 
plaintiff.”134 For that reason, courts must consider the merits to 
                                                                                                     
 125. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 43 (D.D.C. 
2014). 
 126. Id. at 48. 
 127. Id. at 45. 
 128. Id. at 49. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(citing Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002))). 
 131. Id. (quoting N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 
758 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 
485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988))). 
 132. See In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating the standard 
of review for the court to follow when deciding whether the plaintiff should receive 
a mandamus relief). 
 133. See id. (“To this extent, mandamus jurisdiction under § 1361 merges 
with the merits.”). 
 134. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting 
Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on 
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decide whether they have jurisdiction to provide relief. If no “clear 
and compelling duty” exists, then the court has no jurisdiction and 
must dismiss the case.”135 As both ends of the issue contribute to 
the other, the court in American Hospital Association v. Burwell136 
had to examine the merits despite its reservations.137  
American Hospital did not concern an agency’s refusal to act; 
rather, the issue was agency delay which worked against the 
plaintiff hospitals.138 In actions regarding agency delay, the issue 
is whether the delay is “so egregious” as to warrant relief, a 
heightened standard.139 No hard and fast rule exists as to how long 
a court must wait for agency action.140 Rather, courts analyze each 
case according to its unique circumstances141 and look to the six 
“TRAC factors” to provide “useful guidance in assessing claims of 
agency delay.142  
                                                                                                     
other grounds and remanded, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C.Cir.2011)). 
 135. See id. (quoting In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re 
Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95, n.4 (D.D.C.2004)). 
 136. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(holding the the Secretary of Health and Human Servies delay in granting 
Medicare claims was not egregious enough for the Court to step in and grant 
mandamus relief). 
 137. Id. at 50. 
 138. See id. (showing that the issue against the hospitals was the agency 
delay). 
 139. See id. at 45 (discussing egregiousness with the heightened standard). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 51 (explaining how a Court must evaluate and determine the 
nature of the agency delay). 
 142. See id. at 51–52 (listing the “TRAC factors” to use when evaluating 
agency delay). The TRAC factors are: 
[T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule 
of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other 
indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in 
the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this 
rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of 
economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare 
are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting 
delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 
(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the 
interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any 
impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that 
agency action is unreasonably delayed. 
 
Id. (quoting Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 
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The court found that the first two factors militated strongly in 
the plaintiff hospitals’ favor.143 These two factors go hand in hand. 
The first asks whether the agency’s timeline of action is governed 
by a rule of reason.144 The second provides that the rule of reason 
may be found in a “timetable or other indication . . . in the enabling 
statute.”145 The Department admitted that the ninety day time 
table provided by the statute supplied the “rule of reason,” and 
admitted that the ALJs violated the statute.146 It was also noted 
that these two factors have been called the “most important” 
factors and that while there is no per se rule for agency delay, a 
reasonable time for agency action “is typically counted in weeks or 
months, not years.”147  
The other TRAC factors did not support a finding that the 
agency’s delay was “so egregious” as to warrant mandamus 
relief.148 The third TRAC factor, for example, looks to the potential 
impact on the public. Agency delays that impact human health and 
welfare are given greater weight than simply economic injury.149 
The hospitals argued that this factor was met, as they had 
necessary assets tied up in the appeals process, and one hospital 
had its bond rating at risk.150 There was a real impact on human 
health and welfare as these hospitals were forced to scale back on 
services.151  
As noted, granting mandamus relief is a discretionary even 
when all the TRAC factors are present. Here, the threat to human 
                                                                                                     
1984)). 
 143. See id. (discussing the first two temporal factors of the test). 
 144. Id. at 51. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. (“The Secretary concedes that the 90-day statutory ‘timetable 
supplies the applicable rule of reason’ in this case, and she does not deny that 
ALJs are in violation of this rule.”) 
 147. In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).  
 148. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 51 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(citing In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C.Cir.1991)) (“Although the Court 
agrees that HHS has violated its statutory framework, this conclusion ‘does not, 
alone, justify judicial intervention.’”). 
 149. Id. at 52. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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health and welfare was deemed insufficient to grant relief.152 The 
court distinguished this case with others in which more specific 
and immediate threats to public health were at play.153 For 
example, in Public Citizen v. Heckler,154 the secretary was 
compelled to act on a petition asking her department to ban sales 
of raw milk, because “[o]fficials at the highest levels of [the agency] 
have concluded that certified raw milk poses a serious threat to 
public health.”155 The court regarded the plaintiff’s claim as 
compelling, but did not pose a severe and imminent threat to public 
health.156 
Given the murky TRAC inquiry, the separation of powers 
issue loomed large. Mandamus relief does not necessarily follow a 
finding of a violation: “respect for the autonomy and comparative 
institutional advantage of the executive branch has traditionally 
made courts slow to assume command over an agency’s choice of 
priorities.”157 Courts do not have generally have authority to 
reorder agency priorities.158 Rather, agencies are granted powers 
by Congress, and are best positioned to allocate resources toward 
their objectives:  
Such budget flexibility as Congress allowed the agency is 
not for [the Court] to hijack.”159 In the event that Congress 
did not appropriate proper funding for a program or 
agency, “[p]erhaps . . . Congress should earmark more 
funds specifically to the . . . program, but that is a 
problem for the political branches to work out.160 
                                                                                                     
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C.1985) (holding that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services was obligated to act on the petition 
banning all domestic sales of raw milk and raw milk products). 
 155. Id. at 613. 
 156. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(noting that the Department’s entire caseload is related to human health and 
welfare, and that the consequences of agency delay in this case did not reach the 
standard of previous cases where the threat required urgent action). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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Ultimately, the court concluded that equitable grounds did not 
exist for mandamus relief.161 Although a clear statutory violation 
occurred, in cases of agency delay the delay must be “so egregious” 
as to warrant relief.162 As of December 18, 2014, the court did not 
find that such circumstances existed.163 The delay did not impact 
public health and welfare to a grave enough extent, and the court 
made it clear that “Congress is well aware of the problem, and 
Congress and the Secretary are the proper agents to solve it.”164 
Further, “[i]n such situation[s]—where an agency is 
underfunded . . . the Court will not intervene.”165  
B. D.C. Circuit Appeal: The Court Reversed the District Court and 
Granted Mandamus Jurisdiction. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court and held 
that (1) the district court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
mandamus and (2) remand was warranted to determine whether 
the delays in processing appeals were compelling equitable 
grounds to issue the writ.166 Like the lower court, the circuit court 
was highly cautious about intervening in the inner workings of an 
executive agency: “[p]erhaps counseling most heavily against 
mandamus is the writ’s extraordinary and intrusive nature, which 
risks infringing on the authority and discretion of the executive 
branch.”167 Granting relief would “probably require the agency to 
make major changes to its operations and priorities, including 
drastically limiting the scope of a statutorily mandated program 
that has recovered billions in incorrectly paid funds.”168  
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. at 55.  
 162. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e 
reiterate that the district court has broad discretion in weighing the equities and 
deciding ‘whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.’”). 
 163. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014).  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 192. 
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The circuit court saw considerable factors in favor of 
mandamus.169 There was a “real impact” on “human health and 
welfare,” as the court gave considerable weight to the hospitals’ 
claims of financial hardship.170 Baxter Regional Medical Center, 
one of the plaintiff hospitals, alleged that money tied up in appeals 
made it difficult to replace ICU beds, make structural repairs, or 
replace outdated labs.171 The court further noted “common sense 
suggests that lengthy payment delays will affect hospitals’ 
willingness and ability to provide care.”172  
Congressional inaction played a major role in the decision as 
well.173 The lower court’s decision noted that the political branches 
are aware of the situation and are better positioned to handle the 
matter than the courts.174 However, almost two years later at the 
circuit court, the political branches had done nothing: “[w]e reverse 
and remand with instructions to the district court to consider the 
problem as it now stands—worse, not better.”175  
If Congress fails to act or does not provide sufficient resources 
to comply with statutory obligations previously issued, the Circuit 
Court instructed the District Court that it could act if equitable 
grounds existed.176 According to the Circuit Court “[f]ederal 
agencies must obey the law, and congressionally imposed 
mandates and prohibitions trump discretionary decisions.”177 The 
RAC program that catalyzed the backlog explosion was 
implemented by Congress.178 But Congress neither provided the 
                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 193. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 193 (detailing the hardships that the hospitals alleged, another 
hospital reported avoiding admitting certain types of patients who would likely 
trigger an audit). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. (“Congress is fully aware of both the backlog and its connection to 
the RAC program.”). 
 174. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 175. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 176. See id. at 192 (“On remand, the district court should determine whether 
‘compelling equitable grounds’ now exist to issue a writ of mandamus.”).  
 177. Id. 
 178. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ddd(h) (2012). 
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means to implement it properly nor did it relieve the agency of its 
duty to process standard Medicare appeals.179  
The D.C. Circuit held that the clear statutory language 
mandating an ALJ hearing within ninety days gave the district 
court the authority to issue a writ of mandamus.180 However, even 
when a violation is proven, granting mandamus relief is a 
discretionary matter.181 Therefore, the district court was 
instructed to determine whether compelling equitable grounds 
existed to issue the writ.182  
V. Cumberland County Hospital Association v. Burwell: The 
Fourth Circuit Split With the D.C. Circuit and Refused to Grant 
Mandamus Jurisdiction or Relief 
Less than a month after American Hospital Association was 
decided by the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the 
same issue involving a different set of hospitals in Cumberland 
County Hospital System, Inc. v. Burwell.183 The Fourth Circuit 
split with the D.C. Circuit, holding that mandamus jurisdiction did 
not lie.184 Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit found that 
the statute at issue did not guarantee a hearing within ninety days 
that could be enforceable through mandamus.185 Instead, the 
statute provided an alternative remedy, the “escalation” process 
that is outlined above.186 In the eyes of the Fourth Circuit, the 
                                                                                                     
 179. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 193. 
 180. See id. (“Congress fails to act, either by providing the Secretary sufficient 
resources to comply with the clear statutory deadlines it has already enacted or 
by relieving her of the obligation to do so.”). 
 181. See id. (explaining how District Court has broad discretion when 
determining equity and whether a party’s conduct deserves a warrant 
mandamus). 
 182. See id. at 194 (remanding the case back to the lower court to reassess the 
issue according to the opinion). 
 183. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 49 (4th Cir. 
2016) (holding that the Medicare Act grant the right for a health system to have 
a hearing on claims for Medicare reimbursement within ninety days). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 54. 
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political branches were better equipped to address the issue and 
refused to grant mandamus jurisdiction.187  
For the Fourth Circuit, the presence of an alternative remedy 
was enough to defeat the plaintiff’s claims.188 Mandamus requires 
a “clear and indisputable right” to be court enforceable.189 Here, 
the plaintiffs possessed a clear and indisputable right to the 
administrative process laid out by statute.190 Because the process 
allowed “escalation” from the ALJ level of appeal to the DAB level, 
there was not a clear and indisputable right to an adjudication of 
its appeals before an ALJ within ninety days.191 The 
counterargument to the escalation issue is outlined above, and 
centers on the fact that the plaintiff hospitals view ALJ hearings 
are crucial for evidentiary purposes.192  
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the appeals backlog is 
“incontrovertibly grotesque” and “its administrative process is in 
grave condition.”193 However, the court denied mandamus 
jurisdiction.194 
Federalism concerns figured prominently in the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision.195 It first noted that mandamus is a drastic 
remedy that is reserved only for extraordinary situations196 
involving the performance of official acts or duties. “Mandamus is 
[ ] ‘drastic’” because of its invasive nature.197 “[W]ere we to 
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. at 50 (“[T]hat the political branches, rather than the courts, are 
best suited to address the backlog in the administrative process. We affirm.”). 
 188. See id. (explaining how a healthcare provider must go through the 
administration process before turning to the Court). 
 189. Id. at 52. 
 190. See id. at 56 (“While the Act gives the hospital System the clear and 
indisputable right to this administrative process, it does not give it a clear and 
indisputable right to adjudication of its appeals before an ALJ within 90 days.”).  
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. at 55–56 (describing the advantages of creating a full 
administrative record with an ALJ hearing). 
 193. Id. at 50, 57. 
 194. See id. at 57 (“[W]e affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
Hospital System’s claim for a writ of mandamus.”). 
 195. See id. at 56 (“[W]ere we to interfere at the ALJ stage, as the Hospital 
System would have us do, we would be undermining important separation-of-
powers principles.”). 
 196. Id. at 52. 
 197. Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. Of Cal., 426 U.S. 
394, 402 (1976)). 
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interfere at the ALJ stage . . . we would be undermining important 
separation-of-powers principles.”198 Both executive and legislative 
powers would be infringed by granting jurisdiction: 
Even if the backlog were fully attributable to the Secretary’s 
mismanagement, as the Hospital System maintains, our 
“respect for the autonomy and comparative institutional 
advantage of the executive branch” must make us mighty “slow 
to assume command over an agency’s choice of priorities.” In re 
Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir.1991). And if the 
backlog were attributable to Congress’ failure to fund the 
program more fully or otherwise to provide a legislative 
solution, it would likewise be a problem for Congress, not the 
courts, to address.199 
The court also expressed skepticism that judicial intervention 
would improve the situation; granting timely relief would require 
simply putting these plaintiffs’ claims at the top of the queue, 
hardly an equitable solution given the scale of the backlog and 
number of providers that have pending claims.200 The court 
concluded: “[w]e thus share the district court’s belief that the 
political branches are best-suited to alleviate OMHA’s crippling 
delays.”201  
VI. American Hospital Association v. Burwell II 
This section will discuss the second round of opinions after the 
D.C. Circuit remanded the American Hospital202 matter back to the 
district level. Part A will examine the D.C. District’s second 
opinion which was an about face from its original holding. In line 
with the circuit court’s instructions, the district court granted 
mandamus relief by ordering the Department to resolve the 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 56. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. (“[W]e have no reason to believe that any judicial intervention 
into HHS’s administrative process, as urged by the Hospital System, would 
improve anything.”). 
 201. Id. 
 202.  See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding 
that the case needed to be remanded in order to determine whether the grounds 
of the case, such as the delays in processes, warranted a writ of mandamus to be 
used). 
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backlog by a specified date. Part B will discuss the appeal of that 
ruling; the D.C. Circuit found that the proposed remedy was 
impracticable and remanded the matter once again to consider 
alternatives.  
A. On Remand, the D.C. District Court Granted Mandamus Relief 
to the Plaintiff Hospitals, Deepening the Split with the Fourth 
Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit ruled that the threshold requirements for 
mandamus jurisdiction were met and remanded the case to the 
district Court to determine whether compelling equitable grounds 
now existed to issue a writ.203 The district Court was given 
considerable discretion to grant relief because of the failure of the 
political branches to solve the problem.204 This political paralysis 
was crucial to granting mandamus jurisdiction: “The record on 
appeal makes clear that the situation has worsened . . . although 
courts must respect the political branches and hesitate to intrude 
on their resolution of conflicting priorities, our ultimate obligation 
is to enforce the law as Congress has written it.”205 In the D.C. 
Circuit’s view, the ninety day statutory time frame was a clear 
statutory duty created by Congress.206 Its provisions were to be 
followed, and therefore a writ of mandamus compelling HHS to 
comply would be necessary if the political branches remained 
unable or unwilling to address the issue.207 
The court then weighed the TRAC factors again, taking into 
account the current procedural posture and lack of meaningful 
                                                                                                     
 203. See id. at 192 (“Because the Association has demonstrated that the 
threshold requirements for mandamus jurisdiction are met, and because the 
Secretary’s other jurisdictional arguments fail, we reverse the district court’s 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.”). 
 204. See id. at 193 (“[W]e reiterate that the district court has broad discretion 
in weighing the equities and deciding whether the agency’s delay is so egregious 
as to warrant mandamus.”). 
 205. Id. at 192. 
 206. See id. (“[T]the statute imposes a clear duty on the Secretary to comply 
with the statutory deadlines.”). 
 207. See id. at 193 (“[T]he clarity of the statutory duty will require issuance 
of the writ if the political branches have failed to make meaningful progress 
within a reasonable period of time—say, the close of the next full appropriations 
cycle.”). 
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action by Congress and the Department.208 The main factor against 
mandamus is the “extraordinary and intrusive” nature of the 
remedy.209 In other words, the court believed that granting the writ 
would require serious changes to the agency’s operations and 
allocation of resources.210 It would specifically impact the 
mechanics of the RAC program, which while problematic, had also 
been authorized by Congress.211 In addition, the Secretary had 
made good faith efforts to comply with the statute, and 
implemented new initiatives to target the backlog.212 Availability 
of “escalation” as a remedy also weighed against mandamus, but 
noted that escalation “may offer less than full relief.”213  
There were several factors in favor of mandamus.214 The 
delays had a real impact on human health and welfare; hospitals 
are “deeply out of pocket due to denied claims.”215 High success 
rates of appeals were also noted by the court as weighing strongly 
in the plaintiff hospitals’ favor.216 In many cases, the majority of 
                                                                                                     
 208. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 209 F. Supp. 3d 221, 225 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(“Whatever this Court originally thought of the merits of this case, it must, of 
course, follow the Court of Appeals’ direction on remand. In its opinion, that court 
set out several considerations weighing for and against mandamus, each of which 
this Court addresses in the subsections that follow.”). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. (“Granting the writ in this case would almost surely require the 
Secretary to significantly alter the agency’s priorities and operations, particularly 
as to the RAC Program.”). 
 211. See id. at 226 (“[T]he substantial discretion granted to the Secretary by 
Congress ‘to implement [the Recovery Audit Program] and determine its scope’—
including to curtail it as necessary to meet the statutory deadlines—favors 
granting the writ.”). 
 212. See id. at 225 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 
(D.D.C. 2016)) (“[T]he Court must consider ‘the Secretary’s good faith efforts to 
reduce the delays within the constraints she faces.’”). 
 213. Id. at 226 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.D.C. 
2016)). 
 214. Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 
2016)). 
 215. Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 2, 52 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
 216. See id. (describing how the high rate of appeals are causing severe 
financial impact on hospitals). The court explained: 
21.5% of the rehabilitation hospitals that participate in Medicare—
together had pending appeals worth $135 million. Id. at 4–5. 
Rehabilitation hospitals, moreover, win 80% of their reimbursement 
claims on appeal. That figure is even higher—87%— when the win rate 
is calculated using the value, rather than number, of the claims, 
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appeals were successful for a certain type of service, meaning that 
hospitals had millions of dollars tied up in this process for years 
that was rightfully theirs.217 Also, the because of the financial 
burden of the backlog, “some providers are ‘forced . . . to reduce 
costs, eliminate jobs, forgo services, and substantially scale back,’ 
all of which affects the quality and quantity of patient care.”218 The 
court also noted that without legislative intervention these 
problems are likely only to get worse.219  
While the Department proposed some solutions that were 
being implemented without Congressional assistance, the scale of 
the problem was shown to far exceed the department’s resources.220 
Assuming each of the Secretary’s solutions worked as planned, the 
OMHA backlog would “still grow every year from fiscal year 2016 
to fiscal year 2020—from 757,090 to 1,003,444 appeals.”221 This 
was not the “progress toward a solution” that was sought after by 
the Court of Appeals.222  
Legislative fixes were also considered, including the Audit & 
Appeal Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015 
(AFIRM Act), which if passed would provide the resources 
necessary to address the backlog.223 As noted above, the AFIRM 
                                                                                                     
suggesting the vast majority of that $135 million rightfully belongs 
with the hospitals. But as long as the claims are tied up in the appeals 
process, they cannot access those funds. 
Id. 
 217. See id. (“That figure is even higher—87%— when the win rate is 
calculated using the value, rather than number, of the claims, suggesting the vast 
majority of that $135 million rightfully belongs with the hospitals.”). 
 218. Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 
2014)). 
 219. See id. (“These problems likely will worsen in the coming years because, 
as discussed below, the backlog is projected to grow considerably absent 
legislative intervention.”). 
 220. See id. at 227 (“Yet there is one more consideration critical to the Court’s 
ultimate decision: whether the administrative and legislative fixes offered in the 
Secretary’s briefing constitute progress sufficient to warrant pausing this 
litigation until September 30, 2017. Unfortunately, the Court must conclude that 
they do not.”). 
 221. Id. at 228. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. at 229 (“Combining the administrative measures and the 
legislative fixes [in the AFIRM Act] would reduce the number of pending OMHA 
cases to 50,000 by FY2020 and totally eliminate the backlog of pending OMHA 
cases older than 90 days by FY2021.”). 
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Act has stalled with seemingly no prospects for renewed action.224 
The district court stated that “it has been seven months since the 
Court of Appeals issued its decision, and Congress has taken no 
action.”225 In addition, the plaintiff hospitals were very skeptical 
that a new Congress and President would move quickly on the 
issue.226 
Considering the continued growth of the backlog, along with 
complete inaction by Congress, the district court issued the first of 
two opinions in favor of the plaintiff hospitals.227 The first was 
issued September 19, 2016, and was an order denying the 
Department’s motion to stay proceedings.228 The department 
sought a stay of proceedings to give it time to resolve the crisis in 
cooperation with Congress according to its own timetable.229 
Finally on December 5, 2016, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff hospitals.230 The court issued a 
writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to clear the 
administrative appeals backlog by January 1, 2021.231  
In crafting its remedy, the court utilized input from the 
parties, recognizing that it could not simply order the appeals to 
be resolved by the statutory deadline.232 The plaintiffs first 
proposed a broad effort to settle claims, deferring repayment while 
accruing interest on pending claims, and imposing financial 
                                                                                                     
 224. See id. at 230 (“[I[t has been 21 months since the AFIRM Act was 
reported by the Senate Finance Committee to the full Senate on December 8, 
2015. No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary offers no evidence 
that any legislative action is imminent.”). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. (“No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary offers 
no evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that the bill has support in 
the House of Representatives, or that the President would sign it.”). 
 227. Id. at 222. 
 228. See generally id. 
 229. See generally id. 
 230. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983 
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2016). 
 231. See id. at *1 (“Two and a half years ago, the American Hospital 
Association and affiliated entities asked this court to issue a writ of mandamus. . 
. the court can finally grant Plaintiffs a remedy.”). 
 232. See id. (“Recognizing, though, that it could not practicably order HHS to 
resolve each of the pending appeals by the statutorily prescribed deadlines, the 
Court asked the parties to address in briefing the specific forms mandamus relief 
should take . . . [t]hey have now done so.”). 
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penalties on RAC contractors who clog the appeals system with 
high reversal rates by ALJs.233 However, the court was concerned 
with this approach because it believed that it “should intrude as 
little as possible on the Secretary’s specific decision making 
processes and operations.”234 Instead, a timetable approach was 
adopted, by which the Secretary would meet yearly benchmarks in 
reducing the backlog, and eliminating it entirely by 2021.235  
The plaintiffs originally sought any claims outstanding as of 
January 1, 2021 to be summarily paid by the department.236 This 
stance could have created a “perverse incentive” to clog the system 
with unmeritorious appeals, which would have to be paid by the 
target date.237 The court sided with the department and mandated 
only that the Secretary provide periodic reports every ninety 
days.238 The Court explained that “[t]he reports should 
communicate HHS’s progress in reducing the backlog and should 
include updated figures for the current and projected backlog, as 
well as a description of any significant administrative and 
legislative actions that will affect the backlog.”239  
                                                                                                     
 233. See id. at *2 (explaining the plaintiff’s proposed settlements to the 
Secretary). The Court’s opinion states: 
Plaintiffs suggest that the Secretary should: (1) offer reasonable 
settlements to certain broad groups of Medicare providers and 
suppliers; (2) for some subset of disputed Medicare claims, alleviate the 
financial strain on providers by deferring their duty to repay the 
Secretary and tolling the accrual of interest on those claims for waiting 
times beyond the statutory deadlines; and (3) impose financial 
penalties on Recovery Audit Contractors for high reversal rates by 
Administrative Law Judges. 
Id. 
 234. Id. at *3. 
 235. See id. (describing the obligations of the Department to resolve the 
claims by 2021, and that if the claims were not resolved by then, plaintiffs could 
move for default judgment or some other means to enforce the writ of mandamus). 
 236. See id. (“[T[he last bullet point in Plaintiffs’ timetable: the suggestion 
that, as of January 1, 2021, default judgment be entered in favor of all claimants 
whose appeals have been pending at the ALJ level without a hearing for more 
than one calendar year.”). 
 237. See id. (“Requiring default judgment in all such pending appeals if the 
benchmarks are not met, the Secretary contends, would ‘create perverse 
incentives for providers and suppliers to appeal non-meritorious claims.’”). 
 238. See id. (“The Secretary believes quarterly reports—every 90 days—would 
be appropriate . . . . The Court will thus adopt the Secretary’s timeline.”). 
 239. Id. 
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B. Second Appeal to the D.C. Circuit 
Unfortunately, neither the backlog nor the thorny legal 
questions it presented were solved by the district court’s ruling. 
The case went before the D.C. Circuit again after the Department 
appealed the lower court’s ruling commanding it to resolve the 
backlog.240 In a two to one ruling, the D.C. Circuit court reversed 
the lower court for a second time.241 The reasoning was that the 
district court did not address the Department’s argument that 
complying with the prescribed timetable would be impossible.242 A 
court cannot compel an official or government agency to do 
something that cannot be lawfully accomplished.243  
Here, the Department argued that it would be forced to break 
the law whether it chose to comply with the district court’s ruling 
or not.244 The district court ordered the Department to clear the 
backlog entirely by 2021.245 In order to do so, the Department 
argued, it would have settle claims en masse, which would breach 
the Medicare statute.246 The Department is required to ensure that 
any settlement amount bear a reasonable relation to the amount 
of the claim, as well as, inter alia, the likelihood that the 
Department would prevail or obtain a recovery.247 En masse 
settlement would breach these criteria as there would be no 
                                                                                                     
 240. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 241. See id. at 170 (“[W]e vacate the mandamus order and the order denying 
reconsideration, and remand to the District Court to evaluate the merits of the 
Secretary’s claim that lawful compliance would be impossible.”). 
 242. See id. at 162 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Court commanded the Secretary to 
perform an act—clear the backlog by certain deadlines—without evaluating 
whether performance was possible.”). 
 243. See id. at 167–68 (“The reasoning is simple and intuitive: it is not 
appropriate for a court—contemplating the equities—to order a party to jump 
higher, run faster, or lift more than she is physically capable.”). 
 244. See id. at 167 (describing the Department’s position “between a rock and 
a hard place,” either settle claims en masse without regard for merit, or violate 
the court ordered deadlines). 
 245. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *2 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 246. See 42 C.F.R. § 401.613(a), (c) (2004) (listing the circumstances under 
which the Department may settle administrative claims). 
 247. Id. 
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appraisal of the Department’s legal position regarding the 
claims.248  
Alternatively, if the Department failed to clear the backlog by 
2021, it would be in violation of the district court’s order.249 The 
D.C. Circuit found that the district court failed to properly consider 
the Department’s contentions.250 Before granting the relief sought, 
the district court was ordered to ensure that that relief was legally 
possible.251 As noted above, the Department simply lacks the 
resources to clear the backlog in a reasonable timeframe.252 Even 
with the department’s proposed and implemented measures to 
address the backlog, there will still be approximately 800,000 
claims pending before an ALJ by the end of FY 2020.253 Without 
those measures, there would be approximately 2,000,000 claims.254 
The D.C. Circuit remanded the case back to the district 
court.255 The district court was ordered to determine if equitable 
relief was possible given the circumstances.256 The original remedy 
granted did not take into account the Department’s argument of 
impossibility.257 The issues that supported that remedy remain, 
primarily the clear statutory deadlines and lack of congressional 
action.258 It is unlikely that any satisfying conclusion will come out 
                                                                                                     
 248. See generally id. 
 249. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting 
the Department’s position that if it used only legal means, it could not meet the 
court’s prescribed timeline). 
 250. See id. at 168 (“[W]here a party insists that resource constraints render 
lawful compliance with a court’s order impossible, an equity court must examine 
that claim and, prior to issuing the order, find that lawful compliance is indeed 
possible.”). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. at 173 (“We acknowledged HHS’s argument that it ‘lacks the 
resources to render decisions within the statutory time frames.’”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 160. 
 256. Id. at 170. 
 257. See id. at 169 (“There is nothing mystical or punctilious about the 
judiciary giving due consideration to an executive agency’s central argument—
made repeatedly and emphatically across three sets of motions, not solely with 
allegations but with proffers of evidence—before issuing extraordinary relief with 
multi-billion-dollar stakes.”). 
 258. See id. at 164 (noting that if Congress remains silent, the equities start 
to tip in favor of the petitioners given the statutory framework). 
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of the subsequent district court opinion. The likely outcomes are 
either no remedy at all or a longer but more realistic timeframe for 
the department to clear the backlog. Neither reaches the root cause 
of this crisis, which is that Congress must address the issue.  
VII. Analysis 
The D.C. Circuit’s Approach was Preferable to the Fourth 
Circuit’s, but Should Have Paid More Attention to the Underlying 
Problem, Congressional Inaction. 
The Fourth and D.C. Circuits took diverging approaches to the 
issues presented here. The Fourth Circuit, in Cumberland viewed 
the issue as essentially non-justiciable, as it would be intruding on 
its co-equal branches if it provided the remedy sought.259 The D.C. 
Circuit in American Hospital recognized that a separation of 
powers issue would occur either way the court ruled.260 Either the 
RAC program or the administrative appeals system were going to 
be disrupted and would not function in accordance with their 
statutory framework.261  
The D.C. Circuit’s approach was more nuanced compared with 
the Fourth’s. The D.C. Circuit adapted to Congress’ failure to act 
on the problem for over two years.262 As noted above, this case was 
dismissed when it first appeared before the D.C. District Court.263 
That court’s reasoning was very similar to that of the Fourth 
Circuit in Cumberland County.264 However, the petitioners were 
successful on appeal, as the D.C. Circuit was moved considerably 
by the fact that Congress was aware of the issue but took no 
action.265 The original action was decided on December 18, 2014 
                                                                                                     
 259. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 260. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 184–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 261. See id. (explaining the various issues the court assessed between the 
RAC program and the administrative appeals process). 
 262. See id. at 184. (noting that as the case then stood, on appeal, Congress 
was aware of the issue for nearly two years without taking meaningful action, 
which made mandamus jurisdiction a plausible option for the court). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2014), 
rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“HHS’ delay was not so egregious as to 
warrant mandamus relief.”). 
 265. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
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and the ultimate opinion granting mandamus relief was not issued 
until almost two years later on December 5, 2016.266 This delay 
gave the political branches the opportunity to resolve the issue on 
their own. In doing so, the court demonstrated that it was not 
simply barreling into the policy decisions of an executive agency. 
Rather, the court was highly conscious of the hazardous territory, 
and was careful in balancing the wide array of legitimate interests 
at issue. Allowing Congress and the Department this opportunity 
was prudent given the separation of powers issue. However, it was 
also prudent to grant mandamus jurisdiction when it became clear 
that the Department was unable, and Congress unwilling, to solve 
the crisis.  
The D.C. District Court’s order was flawed in that it was 
almost exclusively directed at the Department, while the real 
underlying cause of backlog is Congressional inaction.267 The 
Department has only so much flexibility. Unless sufficient 
resources are allocated to fulfill both Congressional mandates 
(both standard Medicare and RAC appeals), the separation of 
powers issue will surface again. The court has stated that the 
plaintiffs have a “clear and indisputable” right to have their claims 
resolved.268 Either this right, or the functioning of another 
congressional mandate will suffer, and the court will be 
responsible for making that decision.  
To be clear, the court cannot simply order or compel Congress 
to act in a certain manner.269 However, given Congress’ centrality 
to the issue, the court should have done more to pressure that body 
to act. At the very least, the court could have made clear to 
Congress that the other two branches were in desperate need of its 
                                                                                                     
(noting that as the case then stood, on appeal, Congress was aware of the issue 
for nearly two years without taking meaningful action, which made mandamus 
jurisdiction a plausible option for the court). 
 266. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *1 
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (granting mandamus 
relief). 
 267. See generally id. (granting mandamus relief but not mentioning 
Congress beyond noting that it is “unlikely to play the role of the cavalry here”). 
 268. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 188 (stating that to show entitlement 
to mandamus, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “clear and indisputable right” to 
relief). 
 269. Id. 
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assistance.270 As Congress is currently debating another round of 
healthcare reform, now is a fitting time for such a warning.271 The 
creation of this backlog was a result of good intentioned policy that 
sought to recover misspent funds for important and costly social 
programs.272 However, the execution of that policy created an 
entirely new problem, which a gridlocked Congress has proven 
unable to solve. The longer it takes for Congress to address the 
issue, the deeper the quagmire will become for the courts. Nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the fact that nearly four years after 
this litigation began, it is headed to the district court for a third 
time. The prospects for a proper resolution, for the reasons noted 
above, are dim.273 
VIII. Conclusion 
Congressional inaction has placed the courts in an untenable 
position. The issue brought before the court in American Hospital 
would have created a clear a violation of statutory authority no 
matter what the outcome was.274 The D.C. District and Circuit 
courts should be commended for carefully balancing the interests 
at play, showing reluctance to intervene, but also showing a 
willingness to take action when it was clear that Congress was 
                                                                                                     
 270. Id. 
 271. See Trent Gillies, Obamacare was ‘Flawed’, but Here’s What Health Care 
Should Look Like After Reform: Ex-Aetna CEO, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/19/obamacare-was-flawed-but-heres-what-health-
care-should- look-like-after-reform-ex-aetna-ceo.html (describing the ongoing 
attempts to reform the country’s healthcare system) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 272. See generally Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–88 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
 273. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 867 F.3d 160, 169–70 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (“[T]he District Court was assigned an exceptionally difficult 
project . . . . [T]he Court needed to craft workable relief while negotiating both the 
on-the-ground realities and the guidance offered in our past decision. An 
unenviable task.”). 
 274. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 184. 
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silent.275 However, the remedy crafted was flawed as it did not 
truly speak to the root of the problem, Congressional inaction.276 
While there has been much debate in Congress recently 
regarding healthcare reform, there is no indication that these 
elements of Medicare will be changed.277 The Medicare appeals 
system will continue to generate an enormous number of claims. 
The RAC program, with its success in preventing waste, fraud, and 
abuse, is unlikely to be scrapped by any movement to lower 
healthcare costs.278 This issue will continue to plague service 
providers and confound courts until Congress either revamps the 
RAC program or allocates the necessary resources to the 
Department to resolve this issue. 
                                                                                                     
 275. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983, 
at *1–*3 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (granting 
mandamus relief but not mentioning Congress beyond noting that it is “unlikely 
to play the role of the cavalry here”). 
 276. See generally id. 
 277. Rebecca Savransky, Priebus: Trump Doesn’t Want to ‘Meddle With 
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(describing the successes of the RAC program. 
